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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Riverside appeals the final order certifying as final the summary judgment 
entered by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod against Riverside and in favor of 
TBC. (R. at 306-07.) Riverside filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 5, 
2005. (R. at 308-15.) The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001) and has transferred the case to the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2001). 
III. ISSUE STATEMENT 
Two issues are presented for review. 
First, did the trial court err when it granted TBC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed relating to 
what constituted the parties' integrated agreement. 
Second, did the trial court err when it granted TBC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed relating to 
Riverside's defense of fraud in the inducement. 
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An appellate court reviews a summary judgment determination for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. CCD. 
L.C. v. Millsap. 2005 UT 42, ^ 14,116 P.3d 366 (Utah 2005) (additional citation 
omitted). Accordingly, an appellate court determines only whether the trial court 
erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that 
no disputed issues of material fact exist. Id In so doing, a reviewing court must 
view the facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was 
entered in the trial court. Webb v. R.O.A. General. Inc.. 804 P.2d 547, 548 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (additional citation omitted). 
Riverside preserved the arguments set forth in this appeal in its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Riverside Mobile Home Park, (r. at 179-210), and/or 
during oral argument on TBC's Motion for Summary Judgment, (r. at 322, p. 5-
11). 
IV. DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, that 
"[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
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to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves a dispute between Riverside and TBC over the validity 
and/or interpretation of a real estate listing agreement. Through this appeal, 
Riverside seeks a reversal of the trial court's entry of summary judgment and a 
determination that (1) the parties originally agreed to split in half a four-percent 
(4%) commission contemplated in a real estate listing agreement and (2) genuine 
issues of material fact exist as to whether Riverside was induced to enter the 
agreement by fraud. 
Course of Proceedings 
TBC commenced this action on or about August 12, 2002 in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. at 1-16.) On or 
about May 25,2004, TBC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 151-53.) 
Disposition in Trial Court 
The trial court granted TBC's Motion for Summary Judgment on September 
20,2004. (R. at 322, p. 11, In. 6.) The trial court entered an Order Granting 
Summary Judgment, (r. at 236-38), and a corresponding Judgment, (r. at 239-41) 
on October 20,2004. The trial court entered an Order Granting Rule 54(b) 
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Certification on August 1, 2005. (R. at 306-07.) 
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues on Appeal 
In or about June 2001, James Burgess ("Burgess") of TBC contacted Greg 
Hales ("Hales"), a principal of Riverside, for the purpose of soliciting the sale of 
the Riverside Mobile Home Park (the "Park"). (R. at 205.) Burgess represented to 
Hales that TBC had a buyer willing to pay $5.5 million to purchase the Park. (Id.) 
At the time that Burgess approached Hales, Hales was a licensed real estate agent 
and owner of a real estate brokerage himself (Realty West, LLC ["Realty West"]), 
(r. at 31), with no need for another broker to list and market the Park for sale, (r. at 
322, p. 9, In. 5-7). But, because - and only because — of Burgess's representations 
that TBC had a buyer that was willing to pay $5.5 million to purchase the Park, 
Riverside executed a Limited Listing Agreement (the "LLA") with TBC wherein 
TBC agreed to evenly split the standard four percent (4%) real estate commission 
with Realty West (inadvertently referred to as Development West due to 
typographical error). (R. at 205.) With the unsigned LLA containing the four 
percent (4%) provision, TBC sent a fax cover sheet which unambiguously stated: 
"Dear Greg, Please review, execute A.S.A.P. and I will bring in the offer. I agree 
to split total [sic] fee indicated herein 50:50 with Development West. James." (R. 
at 209,322, p. 5, In. 23-25; p. 6, In. 1.) Among other things, the LLA stated that 
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"Owner grants Agent the limited right to secure an acceptable buyer, however, 
Agent is to only solicit those clients which he has registered with Owner." (R. at 
171.) Riverside only entered a listing agreement with TBC because TBC had 
represented that it had a potential buyer at $5.5 million, (r. at 322, p. 9, In. 7-11), 
i.e., but for TBC's representation, Riverside would have never entered the LLA, (r. 
at 205). 
Shortly after executing the LLA, Riverside learned that TBC's buyer was 
Affordable Residential Communities ("ARC"). (Id.) Riverside and ARC entered 
a purchase contract in October 2001 (the "Purchase Contract"). (Id.) However, 
during ARC's due diligence period, Riverside learned that ARC's willingness to 
pay $5.5 million was based on a brochure prepared by Burgess and TBC which 
contained inaccurate business performance data, i.e., data based on other mobile 
home park businesses rather than data from Riverside's own business data. (R. at 
205-06.) Once ARC learned of TBC's improper valuation and through due 
diligence obtained accurate information from Riverside, it was no longer willing 
to pay $5.5 million for the Park. (R. at 206.) 
Thereafter, because of TBC's misrepresentations, ARC began negotiating 
directly with Riverside. (R. at 34.) Ultimately, because of TBC's misleading 
evaluation, ARC reduced its offer to $4.8 million to purchase the Park, 
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considerably less than the amount originally contemplated and represented by 
TBC. (R. at 206.) Riverside agreed to the amount, but only if paid in full at the 
time of purchase and only if the sales commission was reduced from a total of four 
percent (4%) to a total of two percent (2%). (R. at 192, 206.) Because of 
Burgess's and TBC's improper evaluation which significantly lowered the 
purchase price, Riverside and TBC modified their agreement regarding 
commissions by lowering the commission to two percent (2%), with one percent 
(1%) being paid to TBC and one percent (1%) being paid to Realty West. (R. at 
206.) This modification was reflected in the Purchase Contract. (R. at 192.) At no 
time after the execution of the Purchase Contract did Burgess or TBC contest the 
two percent (2%) commission arrangement. (R. at 206.) The sale of the Park 
eventually fell through and the Purchase Contract was terminated when ARC's 
due diligence results further conflicted with Burgess's and TBC's representations 
and when ARC refused to pay the entire purchase price at closing. QdL) 
Several months later, ARC again contacted Riverside and expressed interest 
in purchasing the Park. (R. at 206-07.) Prior to entering a new purchase contract, 
Burgess and TBC again acknowledged in a letter to ARC on February 27,2002 
that the total commission was no longer four percent (4%) but two percent (2%). 
(R. at 207, 210.) In this same letter, in violation of his ethical duties as a licensed 
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real estate broker and as Riverside's representative, Burgess suggested that the 
two percent (2%) commission be split between TBC and Realty West but that the 
sales price be raised by $50,000 so that an additional " 1 % [could be] discretely 
paid" to TBC. (R. at 207.) Riverside eventually sold the Park to ARC for $4.6 
million, (r. at 144), and this dispute subsequently arose between the parties. 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the current case, even without the benefit owed to Riverside of this 
Court's favorable interpretation of the allegations of record, Burgess and TBC's 
own correspondence conclusively creates genuinely disputed issues of material 
fact which precluded entry of summary judgment against Riverside in the trial 
court case. By its own documentation, TBC was never entitled to a four percent 
(4%) commission on the sale of the Park. Based on long-standing precedent in 
Utah and in other jurisdictions, TBC's facsimile cover sheet clarifying that TBC 
was only to receive half of the four percent (4%) commission, presented to 
Riverside contemporaneously with the LLA, constitute the entire integrated 
agreement between the parties. This agreement was further clarified by Burgess's 
February 27,2002 letter wherein Burgess, on behalf of TBC, explicitly stated that 
the total commission of two percent (2%) was "fine with me." The trial court 
erred by failing to consider the facsimile cover sheet as part of the integrated 
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agreement, or to consider it at all for that matter, and by failing to consider 
Burgess's letter. 
Moreover, the trial court erred by excluding as parol evidence, information 
supporting Riverside's claim that TBC fraudulently induced Riverside into 
entering the LLA by representing that TBC had a buyer prepared to pay $5.5 
million to purchase the Park. Hales, as a licensed real estate agent and broker, had 
no reason to enter a listing agreement with another agent and would not have done 
so but for TBC's misrepresentations. Accordingly, in the face of fraud being an 
exception to the parol evidence rule, the trial court erred by not finding a genuine 
issue of a material fact relating to evidence supporting Riverside's fraud defense. 
In sum, when all facts of record are viewed in favor of Riverside as the non-
prevailing party in the trial court case, genuine issues of material fact preclude 
entry of summary judgment in favor of TBC, and this matter should be remanded 
to the trial court for the trier of fact to resolve the disputed issues of fact at trial. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT 
NO GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED 
AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTED THE PARTIES' 
INTEGRATED AGREEMENT. 
1. The trial court erred by failing to consider the facsimile 
cover sheet accompanying the limited listing agreement 
as part of the integrated agreement. 
It is a well-settled principle of contract law that two or more 
contemporaneous instruments which address the same subject matter "should be 
construed together and interpreted as a whole, each one contributing to the 
ascertainment of the true intent of the parties." See e.g., Steinke v. Sungard 
Financial Systems, 121 F.3d 763, 771 n.5 (1st Cir. 1997) (where court construed 
an employment offer letter and a signed employment agreement together as one 
complete expression of the parties' agreement) (quoting Kroblin Refrigerated 
Xpress. Inc. v. Pitterich. 805 F.2d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 1986)). Moreover, "[t]he 
underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the 
intentions of the parties to the contract. I n interpreting a contract, the intentions of 
the parties are controlling.'" Web-Bank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp.. 
2002 UT 88, Tfl7, 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2002) (additional citations omitted). The 
Utah Supreme Court has declared that such a "[r]ational interpretation requires at 
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least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the 
intention of the parties . . . so that the court can 'place itself in the same situation 
in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting.'" Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n.. 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995) (additional citations 
omitted). 
Specifically, and "[w]ithout doubt[,] a covering letter may constitute a part 
of the total agreement." Brown v. Financial Service Corp.. Int'l.. 489 F.2d 144, 
149 (5th Cir. 1974). Additionally, "a writing should be interpreted as a whole and 
all the writings that are part of the same transaction should be interpreted 
together." Confer Plastics v. Hunkar Lab.. 964 F. Supp. 73, 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(additional citations omitted). In terms of the parol evidence rule, a cover letter "is 
neither a 'prior agreement' between the parties nor a 'contemporaneous oral 
agreement.' Therefore, the cover letter is not excluded under the parol evidence 
rule." Id at 79. Finally, "[a] cover letter, as other extrinsic writings, may 
constitute a part of the agreement of parties to a contract...." Richardson 
Engineering Co. v. International Business Machines Corp.. 554 F. Supp. 467,470 
(D. Vt. 1981). Where a "cover letter in some respects attempts to modify the 
[contract document] that it accompanied, the [contract document] is not a complete 
integration of the parties' understanding. Consideration of the cover letter does 
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not, therefore, violate the parol evidence rule because the cover letter is part of the 
contract." IdL 
Despite its obligation to interpret the facsimile cover sheet and the LLA 
together, and to undertake a "preliminary consideration of all credible evidence 
offered to prove the intention of the parties," the trial court failed to consider the 
cover sheet altogether, apparently considering the cover sheet to be parol 
evidence. Specifically, the trial court failed to make any determination whether 
the LLA was intended to be an integration independent of the cover sheet and 
erred when it dismissed without any consideration the cover sheet as parol 
evidence. In response to Riverside's argument on this issue at the hearing, the 
trial court, without any discernable analysis, summarily ruled as a matter of law 
that "it's a straight forward matter. We have one contract [i.e., the LLA] and then 
we've got a bunch of parole [sic] evidence. Plaintiffs motion is granted as 
prayed." (R. at 322, p. 11, In. 3-6.) 
Unfortunately, the matter was far from "straight forward." The only 
undisputed fact relating to the LLA was that on or about July 1,2001, Riverside 
signed a document entitled "Limited Listing Agreement." However, Riverside 
disputed that the LLA comprised the entire integrated commission agreement 
between the parties. (R. at 205.) Hales, a principal of Riverside and Realty West, 
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(r. at 31), negotiated the commission split with TBC on behalf of Riverside before 
signing the LLA. 
The facsimile cover sheet accompanying the LLA clearly manifests that 
prior to signing the LLA, Riverside and TBC agreed that the four percent (4%) 
commission referred to in the LLA would be split 50/50, with TBC only receiving 
half of the commission. (R. at 209.) The cover sheet unambiguously states: 
"Dear Greg, Please review, execute A.S.A.P. and I will bring in the offer. I agree 
to split total [sic] fee indicated herein 50:50 with Development West. James." 
(Id) TBC has not disputed that the cover sheet was sent to Hales with the 
unsigned LLA. The "fee indicated herein" unarguably refers to the four percent 
(4%) total commission described in the LLA. No rational interpretation allows for 
the facsimile cover sheet and the LLA to be interpreted separately. Together, and 
even without the benefit of being viewed in the light most favorable to Riverside, 
they conclusively demonstrate that the original intent of the parties was for TBC to 
receive a two percent (2%) commission. Accordingly, the trial court erred in 
granting TBC's Motion and, at a bare minimum, a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to the parties' intent relating to the commission amount. 
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2. The trial court erred by failing to consider TBC's February 
27,2002 letter, apparently considering it to be parol evidence 
exempt from consideration. 
It is axiomatic that the parol evidence rule is limited to prior or 
contemporaneous conversations, representations or statements. Spears v. Warr. 
2002 UT 24, f 19,44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002) (emphasis added). 
TBC's February 27, 2002 letter clearly indicates that TBC expected to split 
evenly with Realty West the total commission from the sale of the Park. (R. at 
210.) Burgess, on behalf of TBC, unequivocally states in the letter that "[e]ither 
scenario (with a total 2% commission) was fine with me . . . . " (Id.) In fact, 
Burgess, in violation of his ethical duties as a real estate broker and agent, goes as 
far as suggesting that one percent (1%) be paid to TBC above board and an 
additional one percent (1%) be "discretely paid" to TBC. (Id.) This letter is 
further evidence (clearly not barred by the parol evidence rule) which 
demonstrates that the parties' original agreement was that TBC receive a two 
percent (2%) commission and then it reflects at least disputed facts relating to 
modification resulting in TBC's right to a one percent (1%) commission. 
The trial court apparently lumped this letter in with the "bunch of parol 
evidence" which it referenced in its ruling. However, TBC wrote the letter nearly 
eight months after Riverside's execution of the LLA. The letter, therefore, is 
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neither a prior nor contemporaneous instrument and should have been considered 
by the trial court in its determination of the parties' contractual intent. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING 
THAT NO GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL 
FACT EXISTED AS TO RIVERSIDE'S CLAIM FOR 
FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT. 
It is well settled in Utah that fraud in the inducement is a viable defense to 
contract formation. See generally. Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 
1985). Relatedly, Utah law is clear that evidence of fraud in contract formation is 
not barred by the parol evidence rule: "Simply stated, the [parol evidence] rule 
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude contemporaneous conversations, 
statements, or representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the 
terms of an [integrated] contract." Id at 665 (emphasis added) (additional 
citations omitted). 
In Union Bank, a Utah Supreme Court case highly instructive to the case 
before this Court, the Swensons executed a promissory note, individually and 
personally, in favor of Union Bank. IcL at 664. When the Swensons defaulted, 
Union Bank brought suit and subsequently moved for summary judgment. IcL 
The Swensons each filed an affidavit in opposition to Union Bank's motion for 
summary judgment, alleging that the bank officer told them that their personal 
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signatures were needed to satisfy bank auditors and the loan committee. Id The 
Swensons further asserted that the bank officer assured them that they would not 
be personally liable and without these assurances they would not have signed the 
note. Id The trial court excluded the Swensons' affidavit testimony based on the 
parol evidence rule and granted summary judgment in favor of Union Bank. Id at 
664-65. 
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
Swensons' allegations raised genuine issues of material fact "as to whether the 
parties assented to the writing as a final statement of the intended agreement" and 
whether the Swensons' "personal execution of the note was fraudulently induced." 
Id. at 666. The court reasoned that in any case of contract interpretation, a court 
must first determine whether the writing alleged to constitute the contract was 
intended by the parties to be an integration. Id at 664. "In resolving this 
preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is 
admissible." Id (additional citation omitted). 
The court further opined that even after a court determines that a writing is 
an integration, parol evidence is admissible to prove fraud and/or "to show the 
circumstances under which the contract was made or the purpose for which the 
writing was executed." Id In short, "[w]hat appears to be a complete and binding 
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integrated agreement... may be voidable for fraud Such invalidating causes 
need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the writing." Id (citing 
Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 214 comment C [1981].) 
The trial court failed to address both the integration question and the fraud 
question, and instead incorrectly took the LLA "on its face" without further 
consideration. At oral argument, the trial court rejected Riverside's fraud in the 
inducement argument out of hand without considering any evidence other than the 
wording of the LLA, stating - "But there's no contingencies in the listing 
agreement." (R. at 322, p. 9, In. 15-16.) In so doing, the trial court apparently 
espoused the position that per the terms of the LLA, if the Park sold, Riverside 
was obligated to pay TBC a four percent (4%) commission, period. 
Based on the reasoning in Union Bank, the Affidavit of D. Gregory Hales 
assuredly creates genuine issues of material fact as to both issues of whether the 
LLA alone was intended by the parties to be an integrated agreement and whether 
Riverside was fraudulently induced by TBC into signing the LLA. In or about 
June 2001, TBC contacted Hales and represented to him that it had a buyer willing 
to pay $5.5 million to purchase the Park. (R. at 205.) Despite the trial court's 
view, the LLA did in fact contain contingencies. The LLA stated that "Owner 
grants Agent the limited right to secure an acceptable buyer, however, Agent is to 
18 
only solicit those clients which he has registered with Owner." (R. at 171.) 
Still, while the trial court's interpretation of the LLA was erroneous, the 
issue at hand deals with the court's failure to even consider the parol evidence 
relating to fraud in the inducement. As in Union Bank, the "invalidating causes" 
of the LLA did not "appear on the face of the writing." Riverside was induced to 
sign the LLA by TBC's misrepresentation that it had a ready, willing, and able 
buyer, prepared to pay $5.5 million for the Park. (R. at 205.) The facsimile cover 
sheet, which accompanied the unsigned LLA, instructed Hales to "review, execute 
A.S.A.P. and I will bring in the offer." (r. at 209), supporting Riverside's assertion 
that it relied on TBC's representation that TBC had a buyer prepared to purchase 
the Park for $5.5 million. Hales' affidavit testimony further states that but for this 
representation, he never would have signed the LLA. (R. at 205.) In fact, as 
argued by Riverside at the hearing, Hales, as a licensed real estate broker, had no 
need for another broker to list the Park unless the broker already had a buyer ready 
to pay an acceptable price. (R. at 322, p. 9, In. 5-7.) Accordingly, neither Hales 
nor Riverside had any interest or need for a broker in a traditional sense. Hales 
ultimately learned that TBC had misrepresented the Park's performance and value, 
and, accordingly, the prospective buyer, upon learning the real facts about 
performance and value, was not willing to pay anywhere near $5.5 million to 
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purchase the Park. (R. at 205-06.) 
In sum, at a minimum, questions of material fact existed in connection with 
Riverside's claim that TBC fraudulently induced it to enter the LLA. Therefore, 
the trial court erred by failing to consider extrinsic evidence in ruling in favor of 
TBC. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Riverside respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's decision and remand the proceedings to the trial court for 
the finder of fact to resolve issues of fact at trial. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of January, 2006. 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Barry N. Johnson 
David M. Kono 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Riverside 
Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. 
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IX. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL 
I hereby certify that on this A P day of January, 2006,1 caused to be mailed 
in a sealed envelope, first class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.L.C., to counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee The Burgess Company at the following 
address: 
Scott M. Lilja 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
~X)a^d W[-
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Barry N. Johnson 
David M. Kono 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Riverside 
Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. 
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Robert S. Campbell (0557) 
Scott M.Lilja (4231) 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FIUPD(8TfU6T G0UIIY 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 0,2004 
;y Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE BURGESS COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.L.C., ROBERT R. BUSCH, an individual 
STARLEY D. BUSH, an individual, D. 
GREGORY HALES, an individual, S and M 
CO., a L.L.C. and B and B, a Utah Co., a 
L.L.C., 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 02-0907609 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
On Monday, September 20, 2004, at 10:00 a.m. the Court heard argument with regard to 
Plaintiff The Burgess Company's Motion to Summary Judgment as to Riverside Mobile Home 
Park, L.L.C. Plaintiff was represented by Scott M. Lilja of Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & 
McCarthy and Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. was represented by Barry N. Johnson of 
Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere. Also present were James M. Burgess and Greg Hales. The 
Court having heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the Motion and Memoranda 
filed by the parties, and good cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff The Burgess Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. is granted based upon the finding 
of the Court that no genuine issue of fact exists and judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this f,^ day of October, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Step 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
VAN COTT B^GLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert S. Campbell 
Scott M. Lilja 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Barry N. Johnson 
Attorneys for Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
OQ£Q 
I hereby certify that on thisQO_ day of September, 2004,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be hand-delivered, 
to the following: 
Barry N. Johnson 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 f~~ 
626 294322vl 
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lobertS. Campbell (0557) 
ScottM.Ulja(423l) 
kuCoTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
telephone: (801)532-3333 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 20 
SALT LAKE C< 
By. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE BURGESS COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT 
-vs 
JNYER.SIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, 
XL.C, ROBERT R. BUSCH, an individual 
STARLJ3Y D. BUSH, an individual, D. 
OREGORY HALES, an individual, S and M 
CO., a L.L.C. and B and B, a Utah Co., a 
JLJLG, 
Defendants. 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY, 
'OF JUDGMENTS 
DATE 
Case No. 02-0907609 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Plaintiff The Burgess Company's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Riverside Mobile 
Home Park, L.L.C. was heard before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, District Judge, and that 
Motion having been granted in favor of The Burgess Company and against Riverside Mobile 
Home Park, L.L.C, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff The Burgess Company 
recover from Defendant Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. as follows: 
1. As damages, $184,000.00; 
JD16462723 
2, Pre-judgment interest thereon, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 15-1-1(2), at the 
statutory rate of 10% ($50.41) per day from May 3,2002, to the date of entry of this Judgment in 
the mount of $ ^ 36f/; £&**& #fo/*f*)9 
3, Post-judgment interest thereon pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 15-1-4 at the rate of 
410%; and 
4, For costs incurred in the amount of $ Z'F^h • 
DATED this day of October, 2004. 
BY THE COURT. 
The Honorable Step 
District Court Judge 
^APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
"VAN COT3>KAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
j&r 
Roberts* Campbel 
Scott M.Lilja 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BENNETT TUELLBR JOHNSON & DEERB 
Barry N- Johnson 
Attorneys for Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C, 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this<^j£jL day of September, 2004, I caused a true and correct 
sopy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be hand-delivered, to the following: 
Barry N. Johnson 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
<S2U?4322rl 
<52U98S3lvl 
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(( 
Order Prepared by: 
Barry N. Johnson (6255) 
David M.Kono (8770) 
Shane L.Keppner (9183) 
BETSNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone No.; 801-272-5600 
Facsimile No.: 801-278-1541 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG - 12005 
SALT UKE COUNTY 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
INTHETHIRIl Hl.li I I 1,1 , I IIICTCOURT \ AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE BURGESS COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.L.C., ROBERT R. BUSCH, an 
individual, STARLEY D. BUSH, an 
individual, D. GREGORY HALES, an 
individual, S and M CO., a L.L.C. and B 
and B, a Utah Co., a L.L.C, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING RULE 54(b) 
CERTIFICATION 
Civil No.: 020907609 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
'r 1* "V *r * 
1 
Based on the parties' Stipulation, the Court's July 13,2005 Minute Entry, and for good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the summary judgment entered by this Court on October 
25, 2O04 in favor of Plaintiff The Burgess Company and against Defendant Riverside Mobile 
Home Park, L.L.C, ("Riverside") may be certified as a final and appealable judgment for the 
purposes of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Because the Judgment wholly 
disposed of claims against Riverside and because the remaining claims against co-Defendants 
Robert R. Busch, Starley D, Bush, D. Gregory Hales, S and M, Co., and B and B, involve only 
the secondary issue of potential recovery for supposed disbursement of funds from Riverside to 
its principals, no just reason for delay exists and the Judgment is deemed final for the purposes of 
appeal. 
DATED this J _ day of f w \ , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
ritt 
a 
Honoraole Stephen L, Roth 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as toibrm: 
Scott MXilja 
Attorney for Plainti; 
lab D 
Barry N. Johnson (6255) 
David M.Kono (8770) 
BEMNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone No.: 801-272-5600 
Facsimile No.: 801-278-1541 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE BURGESS COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, 
L.L.C., ROBERT R. BUSCH, an 
individual, STARLEY D. BUSH, an 
individual, D. GREGORY HALES, an 
individual, S and M CO., a L.L.C. and B 
and B, a Utah Co., a L.L.C, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No.: 020907609 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
T() Tl IE CLERK OF THE COl MM AND ALL PARTIES OF RECORD: 
Notice is hereby given that Defendant and Appellant, Riverside Mobile Home Park, 
L.L.C. ("Riverside"), by and through its counsel and pursuant to Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Com I ilir hulj'mnu entm-d 
in this matter on October 20,2004 by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County and certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on August 1,2005 by the Honorable Stephen L. Roth ot the same 
Court. 
This appeal is taken from the Judgment awarded pursuant to the Court's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment against Riverside, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 1, and this Court's Order Granting Rule 54(b) Certification, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
DATED this of August, 2005. 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
fcury N. Johnson 
David M. Kono 
Attorneys for Riverside 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ZY^day of August, 2005,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, to: 
Scott M. Lilja 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
David M. Kono 
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Dear Greg, 
Rease review, execute A.S A P . and i wfli bring in the offer, i agre"e to split total fee indicated 
herein 50:60 with Development West, 
James 
RMHP 000065 
TabF 
JUL. 5.2001 8:02AM THE BURGESS COMPANY N0.214 P. 2/3 
LIMITED LISTING AGREEMENT 
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK 
West Valley City, Utah 
PARTIES: 
A. James M. Burgess is a licensed Utah Real Estate Broker for The Burgess 
Company, A Utah corporation herein designated as "Agent* 
Mr. Robert R. Busch, Statfey D. Bush, and D. Gregory Hales are principals of 
Riverside Mobile Home Park L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company, herein 
designated "OwwW of record of the subject property. The subject property is a 
29.01 acre site with construction near completion to build a 201 space mobile 
home park. The property is located at approximately 3595 South 1300 West, 
West Valley City, Utah and is more commonly known as The Riverside Mobile 
Home Park hereinafter referred to as the "Property" more fully described and to 
be attached hereto as Exhibit "A* titled Legal Descriptions. Owner is interested in 
selling the property at the following price and terms: 
PRICB: $5,500,000.00 (Five Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars) 
TERMS: Cash or any other terms and conditions which may be acceptable to 
Owner. 
Owner warrants that he is the owner of the above listed land and wishes Agent 
to use best efforts to secure an acceptable buyer. Therefore, Owner grants 
Agent the limited right to secure an acceptable buyer, however, Agent is to only 
solicit those clients which he has registered with Owner. In the event Agent is 
successful in procuring a Buyer, Owner agrees to pay Agent 4.00% of the value 
of the Property agreed to and payable in cash upon dose of escrow only. 
Furthermore, Owner agrees that in the event of all or a portion of Property is 
optioned by Agent's registered client, Agent shall be compensated at the same 
4.00% commission however only upon actual exercising of option by Agent's 
registered client. 
Owner further agrees that Owner shall pay Agent the Fees as set forth above if, 
within one hundred eighty (180) calendar days after the expiration or termination 
of this agreement, the property is sold, optioned or Joint ventured or Owner 
enters Into a contract of sale, option.or Joint venture on the Property with, or 
negotiations on the Property continue, resume or commence and thereafter 
continue leading to a sale, option or joint venture of the Property to any person 
or entity (including successors, assigns or affiliates) with whom Agent has 
properly registered with Owner. Agent Is authorized to continue negotiations with 
such persons or entities. Agent has been previously authorized by Owner, 
however is herein formally authorized to continue to work with Affordable 
Residential Communities (ARC) as his client. Agent further agrees to submit any 
JuC '5'.a00i'' "8'j0a^i TJ*'BORI^SS'CCWANY" 
N0-2i4 v;^-
A n f nnnJIfJ to 0wffr T J execut,on of thfe as^ement of those clients whom Agent Indicates an Interest to purchase exists w n o m 
S^of^Si 5 .^" * 6tfe6UV* ** a p e r t ° d ° f 180 da^ **" «* - / f . 
OWNER: 
Riverside Mobile Home Park, L L C , 
A limited Liability Corporate 
AGENT: 
The Burgess Company 
A Utah Coloration 
Exhibit "A" Legal Description (To Ete Provided) 
TabG 
Ik Burgess Company 
Wednesday, February 27,2002 
Fax Transmission: 310/545-9960 
ARC 
Attn: Mrs. Lisa Jordan 
Dear Lisa, 
In a discussion with Greg Hales yesterday, Greg indicates he has emailed to you 
acceptable purchase scenarios as follows: 
1. $4,500,000.00 all cash with Seller responsible for 2% fee 
2. $4,600,000.00 all cash with Buyer responsible for 2% fee 
Either scenario was fine with me until Greg clarified that he expects the 2% fee to 
be split with Development West which has never been agreed to and again 
refused by me yesterday. Greg indicates that regardless of written agreements 
with my firm (copy attached) Riverside intends to pursue and close the 
transaction and fight it out with me thereafter. 
In an attempt to avoid all of this, would you and Mat consider pricing of 
$4,550,000.00 with 1% discretely paid to my firm with the understanding Seller 
will pay a 2% fee (1% to The Burgess Company and 1% to Greg Hales dba 
Development West)? 
I appreciate that fees are not your responsibility and will respect your decision to 
decline. It was simply a concept designed to bring about a smooth negotiation 
and hopefully a closing. 
Please advise. 
BURG 0055 
sincerely, 
COMMERCIAL INCOME PROPERTIES 
TabH 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE BURGESS COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
RIVERSIDE MOBILE HOME PARK, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 020907609 
Appellate Case No. 20041028-CA 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: SCOTT M. LILJA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
For the Defendant: BARRY N. JOHNSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
* * * 
1 j SALT LAKE COUNTY; SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 
2 HONORABLE JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
3 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Burgess v. Riverside. Everybody here? 
7 MR. JOHNSON: We are, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Let's go ahead on the motion. 
9 MR. LILJA: Your Honor, Scott Lilja representing the 
10 Burgess Company. With me here today is Mr. Burgess, the 
11 president of the company. This is Burgess Company's Motion for 
12 Summary Judgment against Riverside Mobile Home Park and we 
13 argue, Your Honor, this is a real straight forward motion and 
14 the following facts are not in dispute. On July 1, 2001, 
15 Burgess and Riverside entered into a listing agreement to sell 
16 a mobile home park. That agreement provided for a four percent 
17 commission to be paid upon the sale to a registered buyer and 
18 it identified (inaudible) Residential Communities, ARC, as a 
19 registered buyer. The property was subsequently sold on May 3, 
20 2002 to ARC for $4.6 million. That time frame is within the 
21 period covered by the listing agreement and there's $184,000 
22 owing. The four percent commission hasn't been paid. 
23 In response to this motion Riverside has made three 
24 arguments as to why it shouldn't have to pay that four percent 
25 commission. The first argument is that the parties modified 
1 this commission agreement to two percent. Well, as the Court 
2 is aware, a real estate commission agreement has to be in 
3 writing under the statute of fraud is signed by the party 
4 against whom it's sought to be enforced. You can't modify an 
5 agreement under the Statute of Frauds orally. We've laid 
6 out that case law for the Court in our brief and I'm sure you 
7 don't need to hear it again. 
8 What they relied on in arguing that there was this 
9 modification are several things. First thing they rely on is 
10 I the sales agreement that was entered into between Riverside and 
11 ARC where Riverside and ARC had a little handwritten notation 
12 in this agreement saying we're only going to pay a two percent 
13 commission. Well, it wasn't signed by Mr. Burgess or Burgess 
14 | Company and obviously it wasn't agreed to by Mr. Burgess. 
15 Those parties can't modify that commission agreement. 
16 Secondly, they rely on Mr. Hale's oral representation 
17 that he talked to Mr. Burgess and Mr. Burgess agreed to modify 
18 the agreement. Again Your Honor, if it's an oral modification 
19 of a contract under the statute of fraud, it's not enforceable. 
20 Third, they rely on a letter that Mr. Burgess sent 
21 proposing an alternative commission structure that actually I 
22 believe worked out to a three percent commission, but 
23 regardless, it was never accepted and the agreement was never 
24 modified in any way. There's no evidence of any written 
25 modification signed by the Burgess Company and as such there is 
2 
no modification of this contract. 
The second argument they make is that they were 
fraudulently induced, Riverside was fraudulently induced to 
enter into this agreement when the Burgess Company represented 
it had a buyer, ARC, that was willing to pay five and a half 
million dollars for this property. Now Mr. Burgess did obtain 
ARC as a buyer, did go to these folks and say I have a buyer 
for your property, will you enter into a Limited Listing 
Agreement with me? Prior to that time he was not involved as 
an agent for Riverside. Subsequent to entering into the 
Limited Listing Agreement, ARC learned some additional facts 
with regard to this mobile home park and ultimately they 
purchased the property in an agreed purchase for $4.6 million. 
Riverside says, well, we wouldn't have entered into that 
listing agreement but for the fact that you represented these 
guys would pay five and a half million dollars. First of all, 
Your Honor, a representation by Mr. Burgess to the effect that 
I've got a buyer whose willing to pay five and a half million 
dollars is a number of things. it's a statement of belief. It 
may be sales puffing, maybe representation of future events but 
it's hardly an actual fraudulent statement. I think the Sertos 
case, Your Honor, as you're fully aware of that case, stands 
for that proposition. 
Secondly, if there's no agreement, they would have no 
buyer. The benefit of this listing agreement was that Burgess 
3 
1 Company delivered a buyer to this property and that buyer 
2 ultimately bought the property and the law is very clear and we 
3 set it out in our memoranda, Your Honor, that you don't get to 
4 accept the benefits of the contract entered into and then say 
5 but I'm not going to pay you what you're owed under that 
6 contract after you've done that. And I think the theories of 
7 waive and estoppel and ratification that we put forth in our 
8 memoranda all support that proposition, Your Honor. 
9 Finally Your Honor, this new found position, it just 
10 conflicts with the terms of the listing agreement itself. The 
11 listing agreement sets a sales price or an asking price of five 
12 and a half million dollars but it doesn't say you're entitled 
13 to a commission if this property sells for five and a half 
14 million dollars to this buyer. It says you're entitled to a 
15 I four percent commission on whatever the agreed sales price is 
16 and that's all Mr. Burgess and his company are asking for. 
17 They agreed to a sales price with a commission of $184,000. 
18 J Finally they argue that the Burgess Company had 
19 | entered into an agreement with Mr. Hales and his company, 
20 Development West, to split that four percent commission. Your 
21 Honor, Riverside isn't a party to that agreement and Mr. Hales 
22 i isn't a party to the agreement between Burgess and Riverside. 
23 You've got two separate contracts. We're talking about the 
24 Riverside-Burgess contract here today and as to that contract, 
25 there's no question they sold to the buyer Mr. Burgess brought 
4 
1 to the table. They sold it in the time frame of the contract, 
2 they owe the four percent commission. 
3 THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Lilja. 
4 Mr. Johnson? 
5 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Barry Johnson 
6 appearing on behalf of the defendants and specifically here 
7 today Riverside Mobile Home Park. With me is Greg Hales who is 
8 the principal of Riverside. There's also a couple of other 
9 parties that come up and I'll just indicate who those are. 
10 Development West is a real estate development company. Mr. 
11 Hales is a primary shareholder in that entity. Also Realty 
12 West is a real estate brokerage firm and Greg Hales is the 
13 I broker behind that brokerage firm, Realty West. Those are all 
14 separate legal entities of which Greg Hales is a principal and 
15 a primary equity member or share holder. 
16 I We have two legal arguments that we propose to 
17 I (inaudible) this summary judgment motion and obviously don't 
18 need to raise with the Court the burden that the plaintiff has 
19 I to make summary judgment motion. But in any event, the 
20 I disputed the facts we think are these; first, with regard to 
21 the contract issue. The contract issue is that Burgess himself 
22 does not provide the court in connection with its motion the 
23 entire agreement. The entire agreement is not just the listing 
24 agreement that is attached to his affidavit but includes also a 
25 cover letter that is sent over with the proposed listing 
1 agreement and we have provided that in connection with Greg 
2 Hales' affidavit. Has the Court seen that? I have another 
3 copy. 
4 THE COURT: Yes, I have it. 
5 MR. JOHNSON: That agreement says clearly, please 
6 review, execute ASAP and 1 will bring in the offer, 1 agree to 
7 split total fee indicated herein 50-50 with Development West . 
8 Greg Hales in his affidavit indicates that really Realty West 
9 would be the real estate broker sharing in the fee. But this 
10 cover letter was sent with the unsigned listing agreement and 
11 we have authority, unable to find any specific on point 
12 ! authority in Utah, but we do have authority in other 
13 jurisdictions indicating that generally a writing should be 
14 interpreted as a whole and all the writings that are part of 
15 the same transaction should be interpreted together, and then 
16 | the case I'm referring to is a District of New York federal 
17 case that cites Ohio law. Ohio Courts have often considered 
18 language contained in a cover letter in determining the 
19 validity or defining the terms of disputed agreements. And 
20 then it say, a parenthetical to Ohio case says finding the 
21 trial court's interpretation of ambiguous contract term, was 
22 buttressed by language in cover letter sent with draft of the 
23 agreement. 
24 So our position is is that Burgess sent over this 
25 I unsigned listing agreement with this cover letter saying sign 
1 it and I'll split the fee. Well, there's no agreement really 
2 between Realty West and Burgess. The agreement is Riverside. 
3 Riverside now has a listing agreement where it knows there's a 
4 third party expecting to be paid half of the commission 
5 reflected in the listing agreement. So Burgess obviously is 
6 not entitled to four percent and never expected four percent 
7 and we think that that's quite clear in the agreements. 
8 More importantly, when this sale ultimately closed, 
9 we have a communication between Burgess and the buyer that it's 
10 very clear in the communication that Mr. Hales and Riverside 
11 were not privy to the communication and we have that also as an 
12 exhibit to Mr. Hales' affidavit and I'll refer to that. This 
13 is prior to closing of the ultimate deal and Mr. Burgess sends 
14 a letter to Ms. Lisa Jordan who is part of the buyer's 
15 organization. ARC is the buyer. He says, look, I propose 
16 these two scenarios. If $4.5 million is the sale price, then 
17 J there's a two percent commission. If $4.6 is the sale price, 
18 I then there's a two percent commission and he says it doesn't 
19 matter to him, either scenario is okay with him knowing that a 
20 two percent commission is going to be paid. Now— 
21 THE COURT: That's not what the letter says. It says 
22 either scenario was fine with me. 
23 MR. JOHNSON: Right, but we give this letter as 
24 evidence that he knew at some point in time that he was going 
25 j to be getting a two percent commission and it didn't matter to 
7 
1 him based on this letter - and the Court's correct, it was past 
2 tense because Mr. Hales was arguing that still there's a 50-50 
3 split of the two percent, so we want just one percent to go to 
4 Burgess. But in any event we believe this letter constitutes 
5 good evidence and strong evidence that Mr. Burgess never 
6 expected more than two percent because he said he would have 
7 I been fine with that. But then he goes on to say as the Court 
sees that no, I'm not okay with that, I want the two percent. 
9 I Then we think the most telling evidence is in the 
10 second to the last paragraph where he says, pay a two percent 
11 commission and go ahead and do it the way Hales is expecting, 
12 I one percent to me, one percent to Hales but then just add 50 
13 I grand to the sales price and give me another one percent 
14 discretely. And we think that that not only is concerning to 
15 us because he's attempting to raise the sale price and 
16 interfering with our sale is really relevant to this hearing, 
17 but nevertheless it confirms that he also sidesteps his deal 
18 which was to split the fee and doesn't want to split this last 
19 one percent that he's proposing gets paid. 
20 In any event, we think that with regard to the 
21 contract issue, there are disputed facts and in particular the 
22 cover letter constitutes part of the transaction and at the 
23 most, he'd be entitled to two percent and we believe that when 
24 the Court hears the evidence or the finder of fact hears the 
25 evidence, that at most on the contract claims he's entitled to 
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1 one percent. That's our argument on the contract claim. 
2 With regard to the other issue creating disputed 
3 facts, we have in Mr. Hales' affidavit set out sufficient facts 
4 we believe that constitute a good faith defense of fraud and 
5 inducement. Mr. Hales is a real estate broker. He doesn't 
6 need another real estate broker to list property and to market 
7 it. This agreement was entered into as a limited agreement and 
8 it was entered into only because Mr. Burgess had a potential 
9 buyer. Hales in his affidavit says there's no way I would have 
10 entered a four percent listing agreement even with the split if 
11 I wasn't going to get five and a half million dollars. That's 
12 what caused me to enter the listing agreement, a five and a 
13 J half million dollar sale and then what happens is that doesn't 
14 I happen. The 5.5 dollars turns to 4.8— 
15 THE COURT: But there's no contingencies in the 
16 listing agreement. 
17 j MR. JOHNSON: Understand there's no contingencies but 
18 | part of the inducement is a defense that gets us beyond parole 
19 evidence and entitled to have it heard by the trier of fact in 
20 connection with what induced Mr. Hales to enter the agreement. 
21 I think that's an issue for another day. 
22 I think we have sufficient disputed facts with regard 
23 to what the contractual arrangement is. They sought through 
24 I their motion a four percent commission and we think the 
25 j transaction itself demonstrates they're entitled to two 
9 
1 percent. The other two percent obviously goes to Realty West 
2 if the Court were to find that that was the final agreement and 
3 Realty West obviously is not an affiliated entity but it's made 
4 I up of the same principal and so for practical reasons, we think 
5 it would be inappropriate to enter judgment for four percent 
6 and cause Riverside then to be facing a claim by Realty West 
7 for the 50/50 split that it was entitled to. So, they haven't 
8 j asked for the two percent, they've asked for four percent today 
9 and that's why we think the motion ought to be denied and the 
10 matter heard by the trier of fact. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you. 
12 Mr. Lilja, any response? 
13 MR. LILJA: Very briefly, Your Honor. There's no 
14 I possibility of Riverside being faced by a claim from Realty 
15 West. Riverside has no contract with Realty West to pay any 
16 I commission whatsoever. What we're trying to do is we're trying 
17 to get down to the agreements that actually exist here and the 
18 agreements that actually exist are between Riverside and 
19 Burgess and allegedly between Burgess and now Realty West 
20 (inaudible) Development West but the one is not related to the 
21 other, Your Honor, and this argument about the cover letter 
22 J which purports to establish a separate contract being part of 
23 the contract with Riverside is simply, you know, doesn't hold 
24 up. 
25 If the Court has any questions, I'd be glad to answer 
10 
them. We think it's a very straight forward matter and we 
believe summary judgment is appropriate. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I agree that it's a straight 
forward matter. We have one contract that meets all the legal 
requirements for a contract and then we've got a much of parole 
evidence. Plaintiff's motion is granted as prayed. 
MR. LILJA: Thank you, Your Honor. Would you like me 
to prepare an order? 
THE COURT: Please, thank you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Would the Court entertain the motion to 
have Realty West intervene in this matter to seek its share of 
the four percent commission? 
THE COURT: If you want to file a motion you're 
certainly entitled to file a motion but this disposes of the 
case entirely, doesn't it? 
MR. LILJA: I believe it does, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I don't think your Motion to Intervene is 
timely since the case just ended. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
24 
25 
-c-
11 
CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Stephen L. 
Henriod was transcribed by me from a video recording 
is a full, true and correct transcription of the requested 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed this 14th day of December, 2004 in Sandy, 
Utah. 
(jkbLi^ ^AMM**^ 
Carolyn/Erickson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2006 
hfa ' < - A A CAPOLYN E MCKSON 
\ \ faviy-y M Y COMMISSION EXPIRES 
"- ^ — - ' " J M V « ? snob 
STAlE CF UfAH «*_^ 
